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SUMMARY 
Anti-terrorism legislation, in particular some offences in the Terrorism Act 2000, have a 
restrictive potential for serious journalism. Such offences will need to be measured against the 
requirements of Article 10, a Convention right. In this paper the approach of the Court of 
Human Rights to restrictions on freedom of expression made against a background of political 
violence is examined through a consideration of a number of freedom of expression cases brought 
against Turkey in the 1990s . 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It is widely accepted that state responses to terrorism should be proportionately 
compatible with the values of an open society, values which include freedom of 
expression1. Commentators are concerned that some of the offences created by 
                                              
1 Eg C. Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to Anti-Terrorism Legislation (Blackstone, London, 
2002) p.6; C. Walker, ‘Constitutional governance and special powers against 
terrorism’ (1997) 35 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1. ‘Above all, there must 
be a vibrant and inclusive democracy which can discern the difference between 
vituperative and immature hot air and violence with the potential to spill blood 
and which holds its nerve and its cherished values in the face of the heat and light 
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the Terrorism Act 2000, as amended by the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001, may have a serious “chilling” impact on freedom of political expression 
and, in particular, on the freedom of the broadcast and print media to publish 
stories dealing with “terrorism” that result from serious journalistic 
investigations2. In so far as the anti-terrorism offences can be committed by 
expression that does not directly incite to violence, prosecutions would be likely to 
raise issues for Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). The responses of Turkey, in the late Twentieth Century, to Kurdish 
separatism and other movements for constitutional change have given rise to an 
important series of cases in which the Court of Human Rights (the Court) 
considered the limits of freedom of expression made in the context of politically 
driven violence. The cases disclose general principles and provide pointers to the 
Convention compatibility of specific media practices, such as the interviewing of 
members and leaders of banned organisations, and are relevant to any assessment 
of the Convention compatibility of the United Kingdom’s legislation. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
of the terrorist spectacular.’ Walker (2002) , pp.18-19; cf H. Fenwick, Civil Rights 
New Labour, Freedom and the Human Rights Act (Longman, Harlow, 2000) pp.60-61. 
2 See in particular Fenwick n1 above, Chapter 3, esp pp.63, 90-91, from which a 
number of points in the first part of this paper are derived. See also Walker, 
(2002) n.1 above, p.116; L. Hickman, ‘Press freedom and the new legislation’ 
(2001) 151 6948 NLJ  716; G. Robertson QC and A. Nicol, A. Robertson and Nicol 
on Media Law (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2002) pp.586-592. 
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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE ANTI-TERRORISM 
OFFENCES 
The anti-terrorism offences with the potential for restricting effective reporting 
are, first, offences in section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 that may be committed 
by holding meetings with leaders and members of proscribed organisations; 
secondly, offences in sections 19 and 35B of the Act which impose a duty on 
people, journalists and media organisations not excluded, to disclose to the police 
suspicions of another’s involvement in terrorist activity, and the information on 
which the suspicion is based3; thirdly, section 39 which makes it an offence to 
disclose to others the fact that a terrorist investigation is taking place and, 
fourthly, section 58 which creates offences relating to obtaining  information 
which may be useful to terrorists4. In addition the Terrorism Act extends the 
scope of incitement to violence, an offence that can be committed by the means 
of media publication5. 
 The underlying problem with these offences is that, as 
commentators have shown, the definition of terrorism in the Act is drawn very 
                                              
3 E.g.  R (Kurdistan Workers’ Party and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2002] EWHC Admin 644, [2002] A.C.D. 99, at para 43, on the dilemmas of 
Estella Schmid, a journalist reporting on the Kurdistan nationalist movement in 
the United Kingdom. 
4 For discussion of these offences see Walker (2002), n.1 above, chapters 2.5, 3.2, 
4.6, 6.6; Fenwick, n.1 above, pp. 85, 90-91, 98  
5 R v Most (1880-81) L.R. 7 Q.B.D. 244 
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wide and can include not only dreadful atrocities committed against civilians but a 
much wider range of activities, such as damage to GM crops or animal liberation 
activities, that might, reasonably, be handled by the ordinary rules and procedures 
of the criminal law6. Likewise, terrorism is so defined as to include the activities of 
individuals and organisations involved in armed struggle against oppressive 
dictatorships. The constitutional assumption is that police, ministerial and 
prosecution discretion will be exercised reasonably so as to avoid oppressive uses 
of the Act. However this discretion, the judgment between politically motivated 
unlawful actions which are properly subject to special powers and those which are 
not, belongs to the authorities, not to the media. The latter are required to report 
suspicions etc. that relate to the wide, ethically and politically undifferentiated, 
conception of terrorism contained in the Act.   
Most of the offences, though not the meetings offence (section 12), 
include a “reasonable excuse” defence7 and it is in this context that the extent of 
the legal protection of media freedom is likely to be considered by a court8. 
Section 58, concerning the possession of information useful to terrorism, requires 
only that the defence raise “an issue” which the trial court accepts as being 
                                              
6 E.g.,   Fenwick, n.1 above, pp. 78-80; Walker (2002),  pp. 26-7; R (Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWHC 
Admin 644, [2002] A.C.D. 99, at [36] 
7 The Terrorism Act 2000, ss. 19(3), 38B(4), 39(5)(b) and 58(3) 
8 Cf, Norwood v Director of Public Prosecutions [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin) (public 
order offences) 
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relevant to a reasonableness defence. The emphasis given to media freedom under 
both the Convention and in common law is a strong reason for the courts to 
accept that good faith journalism is such an “issue”. If so, the burden then shifts 
to the prosecution to prove that the defence is not reasonable in the 
circumstances9. The disclosure offences (sections 19 and 38B) or the  interference 
offence (section 39) require the defence to prove, on a balance of probabilities, 
that the reasonableness defence is made out10 which is likely to require more than 
simply providing evidence that the actus reus was committed in the course of good 
faith journalism. The requirement that prosecutions require the consent of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions or the Attorney General, part of whose purpose 
is to consider “the public interest, and to protect defendants from the risk of 
oppressive prosecutions’11, may give some protection to the media but illustrates 
further the fundamental problem for journalists of trying to asses which of the 
range of political causes and actions that are capable of being judged terrorist will 
also be subject to prosecution under the Act. 
 
THE RELEVANCE OF THE TURKISH CASES 
The Terrorism Act 2000 offences do not directly restrict freedom of expression. 
Article 10 ECHR, however, protects not just expression itself but the conditions 
                                              
9 The Terrorism Act 200, s. 118 
10 Cf Attorney General’s Reference (No 4 of 2002) [2003] EWCA Crim 762 (regarding s. 
11(2) Terrorism Act 2000) 
11 R v DPP ex parte Kebilene [1999] 3 W.L.R. 972, 977, per Lord Steyn 
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necessary for expression. The power of journalists to protect their sources, for 
example, is “one of the basic conditions for press freedom”12. Other “basic 
conditions” for effective journalism can reasonably be thought to include matters, 
such as holding meetings, obtaining information and respecting confidentiality, 
whose legality is brought into question by the Terrorism Act. The extent to which 
the basic conditions of journalistic activity require protection will partially derive 
from the content of political expression that Article 10 protects. The Turkish 
cases illustrate the principles and scope of Article 10 protection for political 
expression, including journalism, made in relation to a situation of serious political 
violence much of which clearly involves “terrorism” as defined by the 2000 Act13. 
These principles may need to be taken into account14 when a court is addressing 
the reasonableness or proportionality of any criminal limitation on the basic 
conditions necessary for such expression.  
The cases in issue were brought by newspaper owners, journalists, 
academics, other commentators, even poets, who were prosecuted by the Turkish 
authorities in the early 1990s15. The background was the violent anti-Turkish, 
                                              
12 Goodwin v United Kingdom (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 123 at [39]. 
13 The principal non-state protagonist, the P.K.K., is a proscribed organisation 
under Schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000. 
14 S. 2 Human Rights Act 1998 
15 For a list up to 2000 see Walker (2002), n.1 above, p.66. For summary of cases: 
European Human Rights Law Review “Freedom of Expression: Convictions for 
Publications of Material Relating to the Military Actions of the Authorities in 
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separatist, struggle of the Kurds, waged, in particular, by the PKK16 and the 
violent response of the Turkish police and military forces. The Turkish anti-
terrorism laws, unlike the provisions of the Terrorism Act, were specifically aimed 
at political expression. They made it an offence to express, in various forms, ideas 
which undermined the territorial integrity and national unity of Turkey and these 
included expressions of support for the PKK. The offences did not require proof 
of an intention to incite violence (although some prosecutions included incitement 
to violence). Turkish law also made it an offence to identify state officials involved 
in counter-terrorism activity. A vital aspect of the background to the Turkish cases 
were allegations of killing, torture and destruction made against the anti-terrorists 
forces of the Turkish army and police17. 
 
THE JUDGMENTS 
                                                                                                                                 
South East Turkey” (1999) E.H.R.L.R. 6 636-9. Turkey has now accepted that this 
part of its anti-terrorism laws is in need of urgent review and friendly settlements 
have been agreed in more recent cases which the Court had declared admissible, 
e.g.  Zarakolu v Turkey Ap. 37061/97 and Özlerv v Turkey Ap. 25753/94. 
16 Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (the Kurdistan Workers Party) an illegal 
organisation under Turkish law and alleged to be a terrorist organisation. 
17 These also gave rise to a series of ECHR cases, see: C. Buckley “The European 
Convention on Human Rights and the Right to Life in Turkey” (2001) 1 Human 
Rights Law Review 1 35 
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In all but three cases18, the Court of Human Rights decided that there had been a 
violation of Article 10. The issue for the Court was focused on proportionality 
and the need for the prosecutions in a democratic society. The cases are grounded 
on the general principles dealing with freedom of political expression and its 
importance in the maintenance of a democratic society characterised by pluralism, 
tolerance and broadmindedness19. The Court has long recognised that states are 
entitled, with a considerable margin of appreciation, to adopt special measures to 
combat terrorism20 and these can extend to media restrictions. Such restrictions 
remain subject to the principles of Article 10. Even in a context of political 
violence, Article 10 protects ideas and information that may “offend, shock or 
disturb the state or any section of the population”21. Though states have a margin 
of appreciation, the decisive role for the Court in determining whether a 
restriction is ‘reconcilable with freedom of expression’, in emphasised.  
                                              
18 Zana v Turkey (1999) 27 EHRR 667; Sürek v Turkey (No 1) (1999) Ap 26682/95, 
Sürek v Turkey (No 3) Ap 24735/94. 
19 E.g. Zana, n.18 above, at [51]. Non-Turkish authority for these basic principles, 
cited in later Turkish cases, includes Fressoz and Roire v France (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 2 
at [45]. 
20 E.g.  Brogan v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 117 at [48] citing, to more general 
effect, the surveillance case Klass v Germany (1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 214 at [48]. 
21 First used by the Court in Handyside v United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 737 
at [49]. 
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There is an essential role for the media. It has not only a right but 
something close to a duty to impart information and ideas to the public and to 
facilitate the free expression of analysis and opinions even on difficult political 
issues22. In respect of Article 2 and 3, states have a positive duty to protect 
journalists and the media23. Nevertheless, the media has no special privilege which 
would allow it to overstep reasonable and proportionate restrictions. The ‘duties 
and responsibilities’ clause in Article 10(2) is cited as imposing particular 
responsibilities on the media in situations of conflict and tension. As in the United 
Kingdom, the positive duty to protect life under Article 2 may require appropriate 
restraints on the media to prevent reporting that may amount to an incitement24. 
As the Turkish cases make clear, the duties and responsibilities of the media can 
extend to owners and editors. 
The principal locus of the Court’s concern is on the distinction between 
expression that may be “offensive, shocking or disturbing” and expression that 
goes further and is an incitement to violence. The problem is that the applicable 
principles are expressed at a level of generality that can have little determining 
effect on the outcome of cases. Given the problems of dealing with speech against 
a climate of violence and given the non-absolutist nature of Article 10, the Court 
seems to hedge its bets. There is, it says, little room within Article 10 for 
                                              
22 E.g.  the Commission’s Report in Aslantis v Turkey (1999) Ap. 25658/94 at [47]. 
23 Özgür Gündem v Turkey (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 49 at [43]. 
24 Venables and another v News Group Newspapers [2001] 1 All E.R. 908 citing Osman v 
United Kingdom (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 245 at [116]. 
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restrictions on political speech and debate on questions of public interest. The 
highest protection, higher than given to speech attacking individuals or politicians, 
is for criticism of governments and their policies. Public opinion expressed mainly 
through the media, must be free to scrutinise government actions and 
governments, given their dominant position, must be prepared to accept criticism 
without resorting to criminal sanctions25 even if the criticism can be regarded as 
provocative or insulting or which involve serious allegations against security 
forces26. Nevertheless the Court accepts that, as guarantors of public order, states 
may use appropriate, non-excessive, criminal measures against the unjustified 
attacks and criticisms of its adversaries; its duty is to show “restraint” in this 
matter especially where alternative means of reply are available27. The formula 
here is, arguably, a little loose. It brings together two issues which, under free 
speech principles, are properly separated: restrictions on expression which are 
justified by the need to maintain public order and restrictions aimed at the 
criticisms of adversaries, whether justified or not. If the latter is the dominant 
concern of the state something stronger than “restraint” is required. In other 
formulations, however, the Court is much clearer: “where a publication cannot be 
categorised as inciting to violence, Contracting States cannot with reference to the 
prevention of disorder or crime restrict the right of the public to be informed by 
                                              
25 E.g.  Baskaya and Okçuoglu v Turkey (2001) 31 EHRR 10 at [62]. 
26 Özgür Gündem, n. 23 above, at [60]. 
27  Karatas v Turkey (1999) Ap. 23168/94, see Castells v Spain (1999) 14 E.H.R.R. 
445 at [46]. 
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bringing the weight of the criminal law to bear on the media”28. Where speech, in 
its terms, appears to go further than threaten public order and incites violence, the 
Court allows states a wider margin of appreciation on the need for criminal 
restraints29. Such tolerance of restraint on political speech against a background of 
political violence is, however, qualified by the Court. Restrictions on political 
speech must be closely scrutinised for compatibility with Article 10 and the Court 
is empowered to make the ‘final ruling’ on the matter30 and determine for itself 
whether the interference was a ‘fair balance’ between state and individual31, being 
proportionate and based on ‘relevant and sufficient’ reasons32. In particular the 
Court is wary that states may use the fact of background political violence to 
create criminal offences in respect of political speech, particularly media reporting 
of banned organisations, that, though provocative, insulting, offensive, shocking 
or disturbing does not incite violence and should be protected33. 
 There is, in a sense, something for everybody in these familiar general 
principles with which the Court begins its assessment of the legality of criminal 
convictions based on expression. An examination of the more particular 
                                              
28 Erdogdu v Turkey (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 50 at [71]. 
29 Baskaya , n.25 above, ibid. 
30 E.g. Okçuoglu v Turkey (1999) Ap. 24246/94, at [43]. 
31 Zana, n.18 above, at [55]. 
32 Zana, n.18 above, at [51]. For greater particularity on the Court’s role see 
Association Ekin v France (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 35 at [56]. 
33 Sürek and Özdemir v Turkey (1999) Ap. 23927/94 at [63]. 
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considerations that were important in determining the outcomes of the Turkish 
cases contributes to understanding how the Court weighs the significance of its 
general principles and what are the matters that it focuses upon in their 
application. It is suggested that they are relevant to the issue of media freedom 
under the Terrorism Act 2000. 
 The Terrorism Act 2000 does not directly ban the reporting of the 
activities of proscribed organisations or the publishing or broadcasting of the 
direct speech of leaders or members. However, the general power of ministerial 
censorship of broadcasting that was used in the Northern Ireland  ban remains34. 
Any media ban which had a significantly detrimental effect on the communication 
of information and ideas, would be hard to make compatible with the 
Convention. Sürek and Özdemir v Turkey (1999), for example, involved a published 
interview with a leader of the PKK. The Court made it clear that criminal 
sanctions based on the simple fact of interviewing the leader of a proscribed 
organisation, thus allowing him to speak for himself in a hard hitting, one-sided 
and uncompromising and implacable way, could not, without more, be justified 
under Article 10(2)35. Implicitly the right to “receive information and ideas” was 
in issue since any such ban would show a failure to have sufficient regard to th
public’s right to be informed of a “different perspective” on the matters in issue. 
e 
                                              
34 s. 336(5) Communications Act 2003 and Clause 8(2) of the Agreement between 
the government and the BBC. 
35 Sürek and Özdemir, n.33 above, at [61]; see also Sürek v Turkey (4) (1999) Ap. 
24762/94. 
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For the Court the issue is whether or not the content of the interview amounts to 
an incitement. The ‘duties and responsibilities’ clause in Article 10(2) imposes 
particular burdens on the media in situations of conflict and tension lest by the 
publication of views of representatives of organisations which resort to violence 
against the State it become a vehicle for the dissemination of hate speech and the 
promotion of violence’36. However, absent incitement, the Court is openly wary 
of states using a ban on proscribed organisations to prevent the public bein
informed of the position of proscribed groups. Broadcasting bans may be easier to 
justify given the immediacy and power of broadcasting
g 
                                             
37 nevertheless any 
justification depends on showing that there was relatively little impact on the 
media’s ability to report and comment on the issues. 
  In order to determine whether not a restriction on expression is justified 
under the terms Article 10(2) the Court attends both to the meaning of the written 
or spoken words (or, presumably, to other signifying features of non-verbal 
expression) and to the context in which the expression took place. The balance of 
 
36 E.g., Sürek and Özdemir,  n.33 above, at [63]. This duty is not confined to the 
media but to ‘persons addressing the public’, Aslantas,  n.22 above, at [47]. 
36 Bans on direct speech were upheld by the Commission in Purcell v Ireland Ap. 
15404/89 and Brind v United Kingdom (1994) 18 E.H.R.R. CD76. The reasoning 
stressed the differences between broadcasting and the print media and the 
relatively minor impact of the ban on the ability of the media to report on the 
actions of proscribed organisations. 
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words and context was the basis of regular dissents or separate concurring 
judgments. 
 The words in issue must be capable of being an incitement to violence and 
this matter, initially, can be addressed independently of context. The factor which 
“it is essential to take into consideration” is whether violence, armed resistance or 
insurrection is encouraged38. There is no requirement that journalists or 
commentators display neutrality in respect of the aims, the purposes sought, of 
armed struggle39. If, for example, the overall thrust of the piece in issue is critical 
of the state then it will be protected by Article 10 even if the words are virulent 
and the criticism acerbic40. The language used can be aggressive and the 
judgements harsh, but the piece will still be protected by Article 10 so long as it 
does not glorify or encourage violence41. Words such as “resistance”, “struggle” 
or “liberation”42, used approvingly, or accusations of “state terrorism” 
“genocide”
or 
                                             
43 are in themselves insufficient to constitute incitement. Descriptions 
and arguments couched in uncompromising terms may simply reflect the 
hardened attitudes of the different sides to a struggle rather than be incitements to 
 
38 Ceylan v Turkey (2000) 30 EHRR 73 at [36]. 
39 As in Okçuoglu, n.30 above, at [45]. 
40 Ceylan, n.38 above, at [33]. 
41 Eg Sener v Turkey (2003) 37 EHRR 34 at [44]-[45]. 
42 Gerger v Turkey (1999) Ap 24919/94 at [50]. 
43 Ceylan, n.38 above, at [33 ]. 
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violence44. Expressions of determination and a refusal to compromise are not in 
themselves incitements45. Justification of political violence of the past will not 
necessarily be an incitement46. 
Acerbic criticism of state policy, without more, will not be incitement. The 
words used, albeit to be discounted against context, must be capable of being an 
incitement to violence. In some Turkish cases, the Court emphasised the need for 
the words in issue to involve a clear encouragement of violence. For example, the 
words ‘we want to wage a total liberation struggle’ were, in the context of the 
violent struggle between the PKK and Turkey, sufficient to justify a criminal 
restriction under 10(2). Restriction was further justified in so far as the overall 
burden of the publication was that recourse to violence is a necessary and justified 
means of self-defence47. Passages in publications that advocate intensifying the 
armed struggle, glorify war, espouse an intention to fight to the last drop of blood, 
can be seen, in terrorist, civil war, context as incitements to violence48. Passages 
which seek to instill deep seated and irrational hatred, which stir up base emotions 
and harden existing prejudices or which appeal to a desire for bloody revenge can 
                                              
44 Sürek (No 4), n.35 above, at [58]. 
45 Sürek and Özdemir, n.33 above, at [61]. 
46 Gerger, n.42 above, at [47]. 
47 Sürek v Turkey (No 3) Ap. 24735/94 8th July 1999 at [40]. 
48 Özgür Gündem, n.23 above, at [65]. 
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be incitements including where the object of the irrational hatred and the desire 
for revenge are the security forces49.  
The authorities may claim that words have a hidden or implicit meaning of 
support for violence. The Court recognises this as a possibility but the burden is 
on the authorities to produce evidence of the double meaning. Expressing support 
for a proscribed group engaged in violent actions but at the same time claiming to 
reject political violence or referring to attacks on civilians as “mistakes” may be 
treated as a contradiction but which is also an ambiguity and, in context, is 
reasonably capable of being an incitement50. 
The Court of Human Rights, in determining whether a restriction on 
words capable of being inciting is proportionate, will have regard to the context in 
which the words were published. Contextual matters can occasionally be 
significant in confirming the inciting quality of the words. Words spoken by 
political leaders, for example, may have this effect51. More commonly contextual 
factors serve to deny the proportionality of the state’s restrictions despite words 
which, in other contexts, could be capable of inciting violence. For example, ‘its 
time to settle accounts’ was not an incitement when read in the overall context of 
                                              
49 Sürek (No 1), n.18 above, at [62]. 
50 As in Zana,  n.18 above. See also Hogefeld v Germany (2000) Ap. 35402/97 (urban 
terrorism) 
51 As in Zana,  n.18 above, (former mayor), cf Ceylan, n.38 above, (trade union 
leader) 
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an essentially romanticising literary work52. Where the overall tone of a piece is 
generally peaceful, suppression on the basis of an occasional violent phrase, in a 
work with a generally peaceful tone is arguably disproportionate53. Similarly 
criminal restrictions may be disproportionate if the type of publication means that 
only a very limited threat to national security, public order or territorial integrity is 
likely. Publication in a small circulation journal distributed away from the source 
of violence54 or through reading to a self-selected group at a funeral55 or in a book 
rather than the mass media56 may indicate the absence of a need to suppress. 
Contextual factors may create an intellectual or sentient distance from the violent 
reality and the Court recognises a need to protect the autonomy of artistic speech, 
and above all, academic discourse, which is addressed to the circumstances of 
violent struggle. Lack of impartiality in such speech does not justify restriction57 
and restriction cannot be founded on claims about the underlying motive of the 
writer.  Factors such as publication in an avowedly literary form such as a poem, 
novel or epic58 or as a romantic elegy dealing with heroic figures from past 
                                              
52 Surek (No 4), n.35 above. 
53 See Stankov v Bulgaria (2001) Ap. 29221/95 at para 101, a non-Turkish case 
54 Okçuoglu,  n.30 above, at [48] (neither were the words capable of being an 
incitement). 
55 Gerger, n.42 above, at [50]. 
56 Arslan v Turkey (2001) 31 EHRR 9 at [48]. 
57 Arslan, n.56 above, at [45]. 
58 Polat v Turkey (1999) Ap 23500/94. 
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struggles59 may indicate that, not withstanding express or implicit support for a 
banned organisation or even for violence60, suppression is disproportionate. An 
implication of this is that it will be relatively easy for the state to demonstrate the 
proportionality of criminal penalties relating to words capable of being 
incitements which are published in the mass media61. Similarly, suppression of a 
private individual expressing him or herself through poetry, for example, will 
require greater justification in terms of an incitement effect than publication by 
political organisations. A publication which aims at an academic or intellectual 
analysis of the issue, is likely to be protected even though the analysis is one which 
identifies and broadly supports the position of those opposing the state62. 
The freedom of the media to name politicians, officials, military officers 
and others involved in counter-terrorism and to report and comment on their 
words and actions is an issue in the Turkish cases. Naming in a way which incites 
hatred and perhaps violence can legitimately be suppressed63. Restrictions on the 
identification of officials for the reason that, by being brought into contempt, they 
might then become terrorist targets can be justified under Article 10(2) even in the 
absence of direct incitement (it may even be a positive duty on states under Article 
                                              
59 Surek (No 4), n.35 above, at [58]. 
60 E.g.  Karatas, n.27 above, at [52]. 
61 Polat, n.58 above, at [47]. 
62 E.g. Baskaya and Okçuoglu, n.25 above, at [64]; Sener, n.41 above, at [45]; Erdogdu 
and Ince v Turkey (1999) Ap. 25067/94 at [52]. 
63 As Sürek (No 1), n.49 above, at [62]. 
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2). This is recognised by the Court in Sürek v Turkey (no 2) (1999)64. This reason, 
however, may not be sufficient, particularly if identification is linked to serious 
allegations of misconduct. The proportionality of criminal suppression based on 
the need to protect officials’ identities, can depend upon the existence of a legally 
available defence by which the truth of the allegations and any public interest in 
their publication is available to the publisher or broadcaster65. There may be a 
breach of Article 10 if allegations cannot be made because it is an offence to name 
officials.  The fact that the names of officials are already in the public domain or 
that other newspapers have published them without prosecution is relevant to a 
judgment of proportionality66.  
The proportionality of a restriction on publications can also depend on the 
prosecution and penal practice of the state: whether or not the state moves 
straight to prosecution rather than seeking changes in content67, the persistency of 
the prosecution authorities, and, if there is a conviction, the severity of the 
penalty68.  
 
                                              
64 Ap. 24122/94 at [37]-[39]. 
65 The anti-terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom does not ban such 
information; publication could be an offence under the Official Secrets Act 1989 
which, notoriously, does not have a public interest defence. 
66 Sürek (No 2), n.64 above, at [39]; Özgür Gündem, n.23 above, at [68]. 
67 Incal v Turkey (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 449 at [55]. 
68 E.g.  Baskaya and Okçuoglu, n.25 above, at [66]. 
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DISSENTING JUDGMENTS AND CONTEXT 
The Turkish free speech cases are notable for dissenting opinions on the Article 
10 issue69. There were dissents against findings that there had been a violation of 
Article 10. The tenor of the dissent of, in particular Judge Gölcüklü, the Turkish 
judge, was that the Court of Human Rights failed to give sufficient margin to the 
state in respect of publications which arguably, because of ambiguities in what was 
said, disclosed an implied incitement.  
There are also dissents against the no-violation decisions and, on similar 
grounds, concurring opinions in violation cases. These dissents, associated with 
Judge Palm, argue that making the distinction between words which are shocking 
and offensive and words which incite to violence requires less a focus on the 
meaning of the words and more on the context in which they are expressed. The 
central question for a court is whether there is a real and genuine risk that the 
words spoken might incite violence. This requires: 
a measured assessment of the many different layers that compose the 
general context in the circumstances of each case. Other questions must be 
asked. Did the author of the offending text occupy a position of influence 
in society of a sort likely to amplify the impact of his words. Was the 
publication given a degree of prominence either in an important newspaper 
or through another medium which was likely to enhance the influence of 
                                              
69 Judge Gölcüklü, the Turkish judge, also regularly dissented from the finding of 
a breach of Article 6, right to a fair trial, in respect of the Turkish National 
Security Court, which tried the applicants at first instance. 
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the impugned speech? Were the words far away from the centre of 
violence or on its doorstep? It is only by careful examination of the context 
in which the offending words appear that one can draw a meaningful 
distinction between language which is shocking and offensive – which is 
protected by Article 10 – and that which forfeits its right to tolerance in a 
democratic society”70. 
Judge Bonello in separate dissents and concurring opinions, specifically wishes to 
relate the Article 10 jurisprudence to the “clear and present danger” test 
formulated in the first half of the Twentieth Century by the United States 
Supreme Court. On Judge Bonello’s account of the test, its aim is to confine 
unprotected speech to that which “is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawlessness and is likely to incite or produce such action”71. 
It is clear from the outcomes to the cases they associated with, that the 
underlying purpose of the dissents by Judges Palm and Bonello was to establish 
the need for a higher degree of proximity between political expression and likely 
resulting violence than was implied by the approach of the majority. However, the 
“clear and present danger” test has been associated in the past with highly 
restrictive decisions72. Furthermore it and any context approach, brings an 
invitation to make a trade-off between the likelihood that an expression will bring 
                                              
70 In a number of cases, e.g. Sürek and Özdemir, n.33 above. 
71 E.g. Baskaya and Okçuoglu, n.25 above, at [O-1111]-[O-1117], quoting 
Brandenburg v Ohio 395, U.S. 444 (1969) at 447 and other U.S. cases.  
72 Eg Schenk v USA 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Whitney v California 274 U.S. 357 (1927) 
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about a forbiddable consequence (political violence, for example) and the 
seriousness of the consequence should it occur73. The restrictive implications of 
such a trade-off in radical politics cases is one of the reasons why the Supreme 
Court no longer uses the test, at least in “hate speech” cases. The nature and 
degree of, for example, the “Al’qaida” threat, might imply that the possibility of 
such a trade off could be used to justify a greater degree of restriction on 
expression made against a background of political violence than could be justified 
under the more literal focus that the majority exemplified in the Turkish cases.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The disclosure and other offences in the Terrorism Act 2000 have the capacity to 
restrict the basic conditions for journalism and hence to raise issues under Article 
10 ECHR. Compatibility of prosecutions for the offences with Article 10 will 
require reading down the offences so that any resulting restraint on freedom of 
expression is a restraint on expression which is capable of being an incitement to 
violence rather than expression which only shocks, disturbs or offends. This 
fundamental distinction, illustrated by the outcomes of the Turkish cases, is not 
expressly found in the Act but should be important if, for example, journalists or a 
media organisation seek to defend themselves on the grounds of the 
reasonableness of their activities. It is clear from the Turkish cases that harsh, 
partial reporting of events and of organisations associated with political violence, 
is protected expression and is not in itself incitement. Similarly the reporting of 
                                              
73 Dennis v US 341 US 494 (1951). 
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the activities and views of banned organisations and their leaders is not necessarily 
an incitement, nor is the naming of anti-terrorist officials, especially if they are also 
the subject of allegations of violent behaviour. It follows that, although the “duties 
and responsibilities” clause bears more heavily on the mass media than on other 
forms of publication, the avowedly impartial, regulated, journalism typical of UK 
broadcasting and, to a lesser extent, the press, would seem to have considerable 
scope under Article 10 for effective reporting. It is possible that restriction will 
come from self-censorship and a reluctance by media organisations to engage in 
court battles on the scope of Article 10. On the other hand it is clear that nothing 
in Article 10 should  prevent prosecutions relating to the publication of 
expressions of hatred, the justification of violence and so on. The context of an 
expression is important and it is a matter on which the Court is divided. It is not 
clear that the minority’s stress on context will necessarily support a less restrictive 
approach and it may be that the majority position which, though it recognises 
context, requires that the words be expressly capable of incitement, may, in 
relation to the reporting of the terrorist threat, be more permissive of reasonable 
journalism. The discretion of police and prosecutors and the UK media’s sense of 
its responsibilities, should, it is suggested, be refined by awareness of the Court of 
Human Right’s understanding, as illustrated by the Turkish cases, of the border 
between incitement and the merely offensive, disturbing or shocking. On that 
basis reasonable and effective reporting of the “war on terrorism” and of other 
forms of radical politics, can be sustained. 
 
 
